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“A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe” 
– Contemporary Limitations of the Idea of the 
Federalisation of the European Union
Abstract
In this article, the author touches on the evolution of the European 
integration process, trying to capture the essence of the idea of federalisation 
on the way to the creation of the European Union. The theoretical narrative 
within federal thoughts is complemented by contemporary limitations 
both in the formal acceptance of the idea of federalisation of the European 
Union and in the informal “pole organizing the imagination” as mentioned 
by T. Mazowiecki. The main narrative, therefore, concerns the division of 
the fi eld of EU integration between the analysis of structural limitations of 
the idea of federalisation of the European Union, including the system and 
jurisdictions of nation states, as well as ideational limitations, individual 
approach of the Member States to the integration process or the electoral 
success of Eurosceptics.
Keywords: Federalism, Federalisation, European Union, European Inte-
gration, European Crisis, Structural Limitations, Ideational Limitations
Introduction
Initially, the road to the establishment of the European Union was 
guided by the idea of a peaceful European federation, which meant the 
belief that only a guarantee of equality and the formation of a united 
political system with divided sovereignty would protect Europe from the 
consequences of further confl icts. The expression of the above became, 
* Natalia Sienko – University of Wroclaw, e-mail: natalia.sienko@uwr.edu.pl, 
ORCID: 0000-0002-3111-0080.
30
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
among others organization of the First Pan-European Congress in Vienna 
in 1926. At that time, over 2,000 delegates from 24 countries discussed the 
idea of uniting Europe. Moreover, the desire to establish a federal union 
between the peoples of Europe was announced in the “Manifesto of the 
European Resistance Movement” of July 7, 1944. Activists recognised 
that cooperation based on federalisation would be the only way to achieve 
lasting peace in the future. For the same reasons, the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951. Member States 
decided to delegate their powers in the fi eld of economic policy to the 
autonomous a “supranational” body – the High Authority, which was to 
guarantee peaceful cooperation.1 
There is no doubt that along with the expansion of the fi eld of 
European cooperation (from various spheres, levels of cooperation, to 
participating actors), the integration process evolved, corresponding to 
the present complexity and dynamics of the “diverse and contradictory 
forces”. These diverse and contradictory forces, according to 
J.N. Rosenau, concern the contemporary dilemma of using the potential 
of “globalisation, centralisation, and integration on the one hand and 
localisation, decentralisation and fragmentation on the other”.2 Based on 
these processes, a lively discussion about the way of managing European 
entities arose. In parallel to the original thinking about the EU in federal 
terms, a conviction was developed about the need to create a unionist 
European Union, functioning on the basis of intergovernmental dialogues 
and compromises. 
Despite the fact that the words “A Europe of homelands or homeland 
Europe” were most likely never spoken by General De Gaulle; fear and 
unwillingness to cede a part of sovereignty to supranational power resulted 
in a greater extent of sovereign organisation of the management of the 
European Union than the proponents of federalist concepts were trying 
to achieve. Although the present Union, as an economic and political 
union, possesses some federal features (including the vertical separation 
of powers), it does not have a central government exercising control 
over a semi-autonomous states, and therefore does not fully constitute 
a “European federation”. 
In this context, the author of the article has no ambition to prove the 
correctness of 20th-century theories and models of European integration. 
In addition, this paper is not an assessment of pro-European proponents 
1  S. Parzymies, Czy możliwa jest europejska federacja państw narodowych?, „Civitas 
Hominibus: Rocznik Filozofi czno-Społeczny”, no. 7/2012, p. 22. 
2  J.N. Rosenau, Governance in a new global order, in: The global transformation read-
er, eds. D. Held, A.G. McGrew, Cambridge 2003, pp. 223–224.
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of close cooperation, or Eurosceptics, who are afraid of a strong systemic 
approach and excessive bureaucratisation. Apart from tracing the infl uence 
of thoughts and the evolution of the theoretical approach to federalisation, 
the author aims to analyse certain limitations both in the formal adoption 
of the idea of federalisation of the European Union and in the informal 
“pole organizing the imagination” mentioned by T. Mazowiecki.3
Theoretical Concepts of EU Federalisation
The evidence for the ambiguity of federalism results from the fact 
that multiple attempts at theorisation within the concept concern 
a broadly understood debate, views, thoughts, and values which guide 
the degree of dependence between integration-disintegration of the 
state, collectivism-individualism, and particularism-centralism. Other 
times, efforts to capture the phenomenon concern the recognition of 
federalism as a theory of decentralisation, a social model (organisation 
of civil society), a political program, or a philosophical and ideological 
trend.4 Studies of federalism are undertaken to take into account political 
(national and international), legal, economic, cultural, and sociological 
experiences, and the phenomenon itself falls within the scope of many 
branches, including: normative, regulatory, analytical, comparative, etc.5 
Therefore, an inhomogeneous approach also applies to the explication of 
the term “federation” or “federalisation”. 
However, quite apart from the diversity of defi nitions (resulting 
undoubtedly from the multifaceted nature of defi nition), the concept of 
the federation in the subject literature concerns in particular the aspect of 
the state and its forms of organisation. The phenomenon of federalisation 
in the scientifi c understanding means the system of exercising power 
– the manner of its territorial organisation, competence, and division. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the essence of the last aspect in the context 
of the analysis of the political space remains the most important. In the 
federal political community, the decision-making process follows the 
division of powers, both constitutional and offi cial, between the central 
3  T. Mazowiecki, Dylemat, który organizuje debatę o Europie, Pierwsze Sympozjum 
im. Ministra Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego, Uniwersytet Warszawski, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Ix0JWVLDOAg (access 23.10.2020). 
4  P.J. Borkowski, Federalizm a budowanie jedności Europy, „Studia Europejskie”, 
no. 2/2006, pp. 89–91.
5  F. Lépine, A journey through the history of federalism: is multilevel governance a form 
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government and regional authorities.6 The adoption of a federal system 
does not, therefore, contradict the principle of self-determination of 
nations but leads to their inherence within the territorial structures of 
one state and identifi cation with federalist unity.7 
While therefore, as P. Borkowski admits, the problems of European 
integration were “pressed” into the previously existing “set of political 
and legal ideas”, defi ned as federalism and concerning the originally 
mentioned construct of one state rather than a certain member 
community.8 However, this did not prevent pro-European proponents 
of deepened cooperation from using the experience of federal ideas in 
the process of searching for an optimal method of European unifi cation. 
The fi rst federalist movements which appeared in Europe aimed to fi nd 
a concept of the organisation of a supranational order that would save 
states from dangerous antagonisms. In this context, the main questions 
to be answered concerned which supranational bodies would guarantee 
equality of all actors and strengthen the sense of justice (structural 
shape), and to what extent European countries would be ready to give up 
constitutional sovereignty for cooperation (ideational shape)? 
R. Coudenhove-Kalergi was considered to be one of the fi rst post-war 
ideologists who perceived the need to build a “united Europe” or to unify 
its economic development. The book “Pan-Europe”, published by an 
Austrian aristocrat in 1923, was an expression of a Eurocentric political 
project aimed at discrediting the idea of sovereignty and nationalism 
towards supranational subsidiarity and the formation of a “European 
nation”. In his opinion, only ”self-help through cohesion [integrity]” 
could save Europe from another confl ict and minimise the infl uence 
of the “Russian military dictatorship” or the “American fi nancial 
dictatorship”.9 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, inspired by the federal system 
of the United States and Switzerland, founded in 1926 the Pan-European 
Union – a cross-party movement, gaining adherents among some leaders 
of European countries, which was refl ected in the established national 
committees, e.g., in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.10 However, 
6  P. Eberhard, Koncepcje federacyjne Milana Hodžy, „Przegląd Geografi czny”, no. 
88(2)/2016, pp. 224–226.
7  Ibidem. Quoted from: F. Kinsky, Federalizm. Model europejski, Wydawnictwo 
WAM, Kraków 1999, p. 141. 
8  P.J. Borkowski, op.cit., p. 87.
9  R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa, Pan-Europa Verlag, Wien 1923, p. X–XI; 
W.G. Schwimmer, The European dream, Continnum, London–New York 2004, p. 23.
10  J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, Unia Europejska – proces integracji europejskiej i zarys 
problematyki instytucjonalno-prawnej, IURIS – Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 
Warszawa–Poznań 2006, p. 45. 
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he saw the success of unifi cation in initiating the construction of the 
European Parliamentary Federation or the European Parliamentary 
Union (excluding Great Britain and Russia) by introducing the United 
States of Europe “with a Supreme Council and a Supreme Court, a joint 
police force, equal human rights for all, a European market and a European 
currency”.11 In this way, Paneuropa built as a federation consisting of the 
House of Peoples, represented by one deputy per million citizens, and 
a chamber consisting of 26 representatives of the federal states (the House 
of States), would be fi nally bound by a constitution guaranteeing the 
equality of all European democracies.12 
It should be emphasised, therefore, that contemporary literature 
on the subject underlines the utopianism of R. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
assumptions, especially the belief in the need to abandon the national 
consciousness, replace “inequalities of the unfair” with the just, or mix 
races that would refl ect various personalities to a greater extent than 
nationalities.13 It cannot be denied, however, that this concept resulted in 
the further development of federal ideas.
The consequences of World War II sparked an intense debate on the 
relic of the “nation state” as an institution protecting the social order. 
The advocates of federalism recognised that in addition to improving 
living conditions, equality, and respect for human rights in post-war 
Europe, the creation of a European federation would allow compensation 
for the “dismantled” defence mechanisms, caused, inter alia, by 
unlimited sovereignty and autocracy. Among them there are also the 
“founding fathers”, also called the “fathers of European integration”, 
such as A. Spinelli or J. Monnet. The fi rst was the initiator of another 
resistance movement and headed the European Federalist Movement 
created in Milan in 1943. He wrote down14 the theoretical foundations 
11  É. Bóka, Rethinking the role of the federalist ideas in the construction of Europe, 
pp. 6–7, https://www.eva-boka.name/files/pdf/RethinkingTheRole.pdf (access 
12.12.2020). Quoted from: R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Appeal to all Europeans, 28 April 
1947, in: Documents on the history of European integration 4. transnational organizations 
and political parties and pressure groups in the struggle for European Union, 1945–1950, 
eds. W. Lipgens, W. Loth, De Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1991, pp. 123–124.
12  Nowadays the equivalent of the fi rst can be considered the European Parlia-
ment, and the second – the Council of the European Union, or the Council of Europe 
itself. B. Mucha-Leszko, A. Jarosz-Angowska, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi jako autor 
koncepcji unii federalnej oraz inicjator procesów integracyjnych w Europie, „Annales Uni-
versitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H – Oeconomias”, no. 84(2)/2014, p. 71, 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/h.2014.48.2.69. 
13  R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Praktischer idealismus: adel-technik-pazifi smus, Paneu-
ropa Verlag, Wien–Leipzig 1925, pp. 22–23. 
14  Together with Italian intellectuals E. Rossi and E. Colorni.
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of the movement in a three-chapter, anti-fascist program document, 
“The Ventonete Manifesto”. Despite the fact that, as a co-founder of 
the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political 
Community (EPC), he failed to implement these projects, he undoubtedly 
contributed to the construction of the foundations of the European model 
of the decision-making process and the creation of the EU legislative 
body. As a result, A. Spinelli himself, who was a continuator of the idea 
of adopting the constitution, forming a top-down federal movement and 
a strong, supranational European government, in 1979 gained a seat in the 
European Parliament.15 The other one believed that the proper, new impetus 
for federalist movements would be given by a grassroots, national consent 
to the existence of a political community devoid of a legitimate centre of 
power. According to J. Monnet, the progress of the political integration 
of Europe would be possible thanks to the federal management system, 
controlled by specialists not from elections. Thus he treated pragmatism 
as a premise for the gradual expansion and deepening of inter-state.16
The aforementioned effective rejection of EDC and EPC projects, 
which were to refl ect federalist assumptions, i.e., to emphasise the 
supranational character of members by establishing a supranational 
parliament and the organisation of European armed forces (which, as 
A. Jaskulski emphasises, was de facto related to limiting the sovereign 
right of the nation to maintain its own security guarantees); did not rule 
out integration within another, supranational economic organisation – the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).17 Nevertheless, the focus 
of cooperation on economic (not political or social) issues showed the 
adoption of certain assumptions of functionalism, rather than building 
a federal Europe. Although according to Schuman’s plan, it was supposed 
to be an announcement.18
There is also no doubt that since the establishment of the European 
Communities [in 1951 the above-mentioned ECSC and from 1957 the also 
functioning European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)], the vision of states 
regarding integration processes was often an expression of divergent 
15  S. Saurugger, The European Union and federalism: possibilities and limits, in: eds. 
G. Grin, F. Nicod, B. Altermatt, „Formes d’Europe. Forms of Europe, Economica”, 
no. 218/2018, p. 177. 
16  P.J. Borkowski, op.cit., pp. 97–98. 
17  A. Jaskulski, Federalizm europejski początków integracji europejskiej i doby kryzysu 
gospodarczego, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, no. 6/2012, p. 223. 
18  M. Burgess, Federalism and European Union: the building of Europe, 1950–2000, 
Routledge, London 2000, p. 65. 
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tendencies. When sovereign France, under the leadership of General 
De Gaulle, was to be a symbol of “European strength” built thanks to 
independence from American infl uences, Germany saw a signifi cant 
chance for development in maintaining close ties with the USA. De Gaulle’s 
policy was therefore strongly criticised by the proponents of building 
federal structures, who considered the project of a loose confederation 
of independent states as a manifestation of French nationalism. A plan, 
published in 1961 and created by the French ambassador Ch. Fouchet, 
was an expression of the formally proposed solutions which assumed the 
expansion of European integration based on foreign policy, culture, and 
science while maintaining individuality. Although this project was rejected 
due to fear of French domination, blocking pro-American attitudes and 
weakening NATO’s position (which was especially emphasised by Belgium 
and the Netherlands); showed another barrier of in-depth cooperation 
prospects.19
Finally, when in the 1980s it was decided to build a political union 
(which was undoubtedly caused by the economic crisis); France, Denmark, 
Greece, and Great Britain opposed the federal concept supported by the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, ultimately adopting the Single 
European Act (SEA) without provisions proving this form. As a result, 
as requested by the United Kingdom, the Maastricht Treaty signed in 
1992 also did not include the original formula “a Union with a federal 
goal”.20 Further hopes were sought in the Treaty of Nice (2003), the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) rejected by France and the 
Netherlands, and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), but the latter did not spark 
federal enthusiasm also.
This does not change the fact that some federal features of the modern 
European Union have been concentrated around the levels of power 
between nation states, their representative bodies, and the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union (a bicameral system), 
strengthened by an executive institution - the European Commission and 
a judicial institution – the Court of Justice of the Union European Union, 
or EU agents such as Europol and Eurojust. The principle of the primacy 
19  Ibidem, pp. 77–78. 
20  It is worth noting that Great Britain refused to enter the ECSC in 1951 and 
1957, but when it decided to become a member, General De Gaulle has vetoed twice. 
B. Master, Teorie i koncepcje zjednoczeniowe Unii Europejskiej w założeniach programow-
ych oraz w praktyce polskiej polityki integracyjnej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 
Katowice 2014, pp. 104–110; R. Grzeszczak, Federalizacja systemu Unii Europejskiej, 
in: Quo vadis Europo III?, eds. E. Piontek, K. Karasiewicz, Urząd Komitetu Integracji 
Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009, pp. 163–164. 
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of the application of EU law over national law is also an important issue. 
Also, many ideas should not be belittled, including the following: the 
euro area, the Schengen Agreement, the “Ode to Joy” (recognised as the 
anthem), the European fl ag with twelve golden stars on a blue background, 
Europe Day celebrated on May 9, a passport in the colour of Burgundy 
wine, or the Euroband itself on the registration plates of cars registered 
in the EU. Whenever the activities of various European federation-
building movements and all kinds of formal manifestations of federal 
integration can be recalled, and the presence of European solidarity and 
identity is mentioned; it should be particularly emphasised that, since 
the establishment of the European Communities, there has not been 
a situation in which the Member States would express their political will 
and unanimously opt for a complete rejection of their autonomy towards 
a “European federation”.21
Structural Limitations
One of the contemporary problems that raise many questions on the 
integration project based on the federalism model is the institutional 
complexity and centralisation of power towards technocratic Brussels, which 
has aroused considerable opposition from many citizens of the Member 
States for years. It turns out that the policy making of actors, sometimes 
referred to as “unelected bureaucrats”, remains incomprehensible. Thus, 
while the heads of state and government participating in the meetings of 
the European Council (a political body) are elected directly or indirectly 
in the Member States, similarly to the ministers of foreign affairs or other 
ministries of the Council of the European Union (decision-making body); this 
defi nition applies to the members of the European Commission. However, 
it mostly affects civil servants rather than the College of Commissioners 
– 28 members initially delegated thanks to Member States’ suggestions, 
endorsed by the European Parliament and fi nally appointed by the European 
Council.22 While some point to the lack of accountability of the European 
Commission (whose partial responsibility is an expression of elections to 
national governments and Members of the European Parliament), others 
accuse some national states of wielding excessive power. 
It is therefore argued that one of the arguments regarding the lack 
of a solidarity policy is the unprecedented election of Donald Tusk as 
21  R. Grzeszczak, op.cit., pp. 163–165. 
22  Does it make sense to refer to EU offi cials as „unelected bureaucrats”?, https://www.
economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/07/14/does-it-make-sense-to-refer-to-
eu-offi cials-as-unelected-bureaucrats (access 25.01.2021).
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President of the European Council in 2017, despite the opposition of 
the Polish government. Secondly, the proposal to reduce the number of 
commissioners in the European Commission is also worrying. Supporters 
of their restriction, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, admit 
that the task of independent commissioners is to act in the interest of the 
Community, not represent the interests of the Member States. In their 
opinion, there are grounds for some countries to resign from appointing 
a college member. Excessive dispersion contributes to lowering the 
effectiveness of activities, and the trust and acceptance of a small college 
will be (according to the supporters of federalisation) a visible sign of 
supranational governance. However, among some Member States, such 
as in Poland and Hungary, there was concern about the downgrading of 
the role of smaller states and the temporary loss of representation in the 
European Commission. In this context, Ireland also expressed concern by 
opposing in 2008 the content of the Lisbon Treaty, which provided for the 
possibility of reducing the composition of the College of Commissioners. 
According to the Eurosceptics, this means that, contrary to assurances, 
the European Commission does not remain a completely independent 
body.23
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty initiated the arduous 
process of introducing new restrictions. Overregulation remains apparent 
in many meticulous and seemingly insignifi cant aspects – from the legal 
framework of the electricity market and the limits of its consumption 
in toasters, to the debate about considering carrots as a fruit or snail as 
a fi sh, to analysing the correct curvature of bananas when the regulation 
of September 16, 1994, stated that bananas may have “slight defects in 
shape” and “slight skin defects”.24 Formality, ineffi ciency and lack of 
transparency of procedures, and repeatedly raising issues considered 
absurd, also resulted in criticism of countries that are among the most 
competitive in the EU, such as Germany and, until recently, Great Britain, 
promoting a free-market economy.25
The fi nancial crisis in the euro area also showed a signifi cant weakness 
and structural limitations of the EU [especially within the monetary 
23  J. Chmiel, Polskę czeka szantaż ze strony UE? Polska może nie mieć swojego komis-
arza w Unii Europejskiej!, https://www.stefczyk.info/2019/04/30/polske-czeka-szantaz-
ze-strony-ue-polska-moze-nie-miec-swojego-komisarza-w-unii-europejskiej/ (access 
25.01.2021).
24  Commission Regulation (EC) no. 2257/94 of 16 September 1994 laying down 
quality standards for bananas, OJ L 245, Brussels 20.09.1994.
25  Ping Chan S., Germany pleads with UK to remain in EU to fi ght red tape, https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/fi nance/economics/11718554/Germany-pleas-with-UK-to-re-
main-in-EU-to-fi ght-red-tape.html (access 1.02.2021).
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policy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)]. Despite the fact 
that the currency integration chosen by countries with different levels 
of competitiveness was to contribute to the elimination of structural 
inequalities, it resulted in an increase in imbalance and sensitivity to 
“asymmetric shocks”. In the indebted European public sector, it did not 
protect against the effects of global paralysis. Interestingly, another cause 
of the instability of the euro area is the adoption of a federal monetary 
system, which is not commensurate with the neutralisation of this type of 
recession by fi scal integration (fi scal federalism) and the high mobility on 
the labour market observed in federal countries.26
In particular, the lack of fi nancial discipline and fl exibility of the 
European market, as well as, according to A. Visvizi, the insuffi cient 
capacity to make authoritative political decisions, limited the introduction 
of mechanisms that effectively maintain the stability of the economic and 
monetary union. As a result, the EU leadership, in agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), was forced to neutralise the consequences of the Greek ruling party’s 
decisions (excessive spending or concealing the state of the economy) 
of the multi-annual aid program, granting loans worth over EUR 300 
billion since 2010 and buying Greek, as well as Irish, Italian, Spanish, 
and Portuguese bonds in 2010–2012. Due to the lack of a cohesion policy, 
designed at the central level of the monetary union and conducted in 
the event of an economic downturn, the most stable euro area countries, 
such as Austria and Germany, were among the creditworthy countries. 
Both countries, previously criticised for suspending the program due to 
concerns over the transfer of their taxpayers’ money, were subsequently 
accused of taking advantage of the economic crisis and earning interest 
on loans.27
There is no doubt, therefore, that the natural consequence of the 
weakness of the institutional system, in which mechanisms imposing free-
market reforms were not implemented, was, as admitted by T.G. Rosse 
“a growing tendency to differentiate political power between member states 
26  A. Visvizi, The eurozone crisis in perspective: causes and implications, in: The euro-
zone crisis: implications for Central and Eastern Europe, eds. A. Visvizi, T. Stępniewski, 
„Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, no. 10(5)/2012, pp. 13–16; Unia 
Europejska i strefa euro. Doświadczenia i wyzwania ekonomiczne, techniczne, inżynieryjne, 
eds. M. Gwóźdź-Lasoń, S. Miklaszewicz, K. Pujer, Exante, Wrocław 2017, pp. 
46–48; T.G. Rosse, Systemowe uwarunkowania kryzysu strefy euro, Instytut Studiów 
Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2010, p. 347, http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/
Content/35518/015.pdf (access 2.02.2021).
27  Ibidem; Austriacy zarobili na nieszczęściu Grecji, https://wgospodarce.pl/
informacje/53049-austriacy-zarobili-na-nieszczesciu-grecji (access 5.02.2021).
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and strive to maximise national interests within existing institutions”.28 
It is not surprising that it is the national decision-makers who pursue 
fi scal policy and transfer aid from national budgets that coordinate the 
stability of the euro system, on terms that they themselves accept. In view 
of the above, the circumstances surrounding the crisis, including the 
strengthening of Germany’s position as the EU leader, gave rise in 2015 
to Greek demands for German reparations for the effects of World War 
II and sustained further opposition from Member States (downplaying 
their disapproval of the enlargement of the euro area) against excessive 
redistribution of taxes to the EU fund. Thus, the perspective of the 
political will to harmonise legislative and institutional solutions at the 
national and supranational level was still receding.29
Further limitations in the process of EU integration concerned the 
gradual expansion of the Schengen Area and the different perceptions 
of the Member States about institutional cooperation in the fi eld of 
preventing and combating crime, migration issues, asylum policy, and 
judicial cooperation. Removing controls at the EU’s internal borders 
required harmonised measures to build the security of the European 
organisation. Although in 2002 it was decided to set up a European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW), and following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, an 
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (EU-CTC) was appointed; Europol 
as a fully-fl edged police agency designated to fi ght cross-border organised 
crime and terrorism was established in 2010 after almost 30 years of 
debate on its shape. In the process of its formation, countries wondered 
whether the transfer of classifi ed information to other Member States 
would harm the image of a state fi ghting organised crime, and what 
police powers could be transferred to the agency. First and foremost, the 
lengthy process of formation was a consequence of concerns about the 
authorisation of Europol offi cers to conduct investigations without the 
consent of the Member States. Therefore, there is no possibility of using 
coercive measures on behalf of the agency, and transnational cooperation 
concerns in particular the exchange of operational information, expertise 
or strategic data.30 Similarly, Eurojust – established to fi ght transnational 
crime and meeting Europol’s competences in the fi eld of operational 
and strategic cooperation in the fi eld of the judiciary, has no practical 
28  T.G. Rosse, op.cit., p. 343.
29  Ibidem, pp. 346–347; A. Visvizi, Niebezpieczne związki, czyli Niemcy i Grecja 
w dobie kryzysu, „Biuletyn Niemiecki”, no. 58/2015, pp. 2-8. 
30  More on this: N. Sienko, Europejski Urząd Policji – działania operacyjne na rzecz 
przeciwdziałania nielegalnej migracji i handlu ludźmi, „Rynek – Społeczeństwo – Kul-
tura”, no. 26/2017, pp. 53–56.
40
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2021
instruments that would entitle EU citizens to be prosecuted before the 
competent courts of the Member States, if they do not demonstrate such 
will.31
However, while common foundations have been established in 
the fi eld of data transfer, a pressing problem in 2015 due to the record 
number of third-country nationals arriving in Europe turned out to be 
a lively discussion about the EU’s limited resources to fi ght the cross-
border activity of people who illegally transport immigrants and the very 
effects of migration. In September of that year, German border controls 
were strengthened, and the German government was followed by, among 
others, Austrian, Hungarian, and Slovak authorities. The construction of 
a wall separating Bulgaria from Turkey was also started. Thus, it turned out 
that Frontex, established in 2004 (the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency since 2016), is unable to seal the EU’s external borders. Despite 
the fact that Poland, Germany, Austria, and France supported the need to 
increase the capacity of the agency to provide technical and operational 
support to the Member States allowing border control, the rulers did not 
reach an agreement on the announced obligation to accept the number of 
immigrants imposed by the European Commission. Germany and France 
envisaged the support of Greece and Italy, which are on the fi rst transit 
line on the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes. Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria, concerned about the lack of 
institutional opportunities and fi nancial resources, refused to introduce 
an immigration reform.32
Fear of being unable to solve the problem of illegal immigration 
resulted in mutual migratory pressures, emphasising the importance 
of national security policies rather than the European solidarity of EU 
members. Accordingly, as J. Estevens notes: “(…) all Member States tend 
to impose their own protection standards on EU asylum policies at EU 
level, but some (...) infl uence EU policies more effectively than others, 
and therefore there are Member States to have a greater impact on the 
legislative outcomes of migration and asylum in the EU”.33
As in the case of diffi culties with the development of an appropriate 
system and ruling powers of national states, a coordinated response to 
31  Council Decision no 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforc-
ing the fi ght against serious crime, O.J. L 63/1, 6.3.2002, Brussels 28.02.2002.
32  Where do EU countries stand on migration?, https://www.dw.com/en/where-do-eu-
countries-stand-on-migration/a-44356857 (access 17.02.2021).
33  J. Estevens, Migration crisis in the EU: developing a framework for analysis of na-
tional security and defence strategies, „Comparative Migration Studies”, no. 1/2018, p. 7, 
DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1186/s40878-018-0093-3. 
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economic problems or a crisis hitting the European migration and 
asylum policy; the importance of individual security of the Member 
States, translated above the EU subsidiarity and solidarity, is evidenced 
by the recent reports on the introduction of the export ban, blocking the 
shipments of protective materials, medical equipment and other personal 
protective equipment used to fi ght the COVID-19 pandemic,34 as well as 
independent negotiations with producers vaccines and the purchase of 
additional doses outside the EU vaccination strategy, coordinated by the 
European Commission.35 It seems, therefore, that it is the difference in 
the matter of counteracting the effects of the coronavirus, including the 
lack of consent to the establishment and spending of the EU aid fund, 
that will affect the further debate on the legitimacy of the functioning of 
the EU in its present shape. 
Ideational Limitations
Life in the age of globalisation, that is “the gradual expansion on 
a global scale of the social impact of the division of labour and market 
exchange, connections and interactions between human communities in 
all spheres of life”, sparked the aforementioned debate on the relic of the 
“state”. Therefore, one cannot disagree with the fact that some state com-
petences have been shifted to supranational actors (international organi-
sations, such as the EU) and the groups below its level (e.g. specialised in 
maintaining public security and order) or the instruments next to it (e.g. 
mass media).36 The fact is that it is the state, which is the main actor in 
international relations, that faces a number of challenges. It is undeniable 
that “the creation of a European federation would mean the collective 
suicide of nation states”.37 
34  This process concerns, inter alia, Germany, Poland, Slovakia or Romania. 
K. Kaźmierczak, Niemcy wstrzymały maseczki zakupione przez Włochów z Chin, https://
kresy.pl/wydarzenia/regiony/europa-zachodnia/niemcy-wstrzymaly-maseczki-zaku-
pione-przez-wlochow-z-chin/ (access 20.02.2021).
35  Szczepienia przeciwko COVID-19 w Europie. Węgry i Niemcy wyłamały się z mech-
anizmu wspólnych zakupów, https://pulsmedycyny.pl/szczepienia-przeciwko-covid-
19-w-europie-wegry-i-niemcy-wylamaly-sie-z-mechanizmu-wspolnych-zakupow-
1107808 (access 20.02.2021).
36  J. Ruszkowski, Państwo poza państwem. Wstępna konceptualizacja procesu przesu-
wania władzy państwa na otoczenie pozapaństwowe, in: Państwo w czasach zmiany, eds. 
M. Pietraś, I. Hofman, S. Michałowski, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2018, 
pp. 90–91. 
37  J. Zielonka, Kontrrewolucja. Liberalna Europa w odwrocie, Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe PWN, Warszawa 2018, p. 229.
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One of the reasons why states do not build a European federation 
is therefore nationalism, which is a construct of nations’ past, their 
historically conditioned aspirations for sovereignty, and is now understood 
as a special promotion of solidarity within the internal borders of EU 
members. This attitude, emerging from growing concerns about the loss 
of control over the implementation of state interests, the contemporary 
sense of economic injustice, or resulting from the threat to the cohesion 
of social groups, could be the reason for the lack of will to federalise the 
EU structures. 
Also, the current failure to apply the reallocation system proposed by 
the EU bodies is due to the fear of the inability to tackle illegal immigration 
transnationally. The lack of trust contributed to the subjective rhetoric 
of the citizens of countries in which the necessity to enter into new 
types of social interactions caused considerable concern about internal 
security. On the one hand, the migration crisis contributed to the spread 
of Islamophobia and racism in social media. The record migratory fl ows 
were seen as a threat to the stability and development of the state and gave 
rise to the formation of anti-immigrant groups, and resulted in physical 
manifestations of hatred. On the other hand, however, there have been 
accusations of leftism and idealisation of life in the “multi-culti” space by 
groups emphasising supra-state and supra-ethnic solidarity.38
However, taking into consideration recent events, the expression of 
the divided Union has also completed the picture of emerging “extremist 
narratives inside right-wing political parties”.39 Among the Eurosceptics 
who criticised some of the Community ideas were, inter alia, Law and 
Justice in Poland, Fidesz with the Christian Democratic People’s Party in 
Hungary, and the Sweden Democrats rejecting the adoption of the euro 
in Sweden.40 Moreover, it seems that the results of the elections to the 
European Parliament in 2014 and 2019 showed the regression of liberal 
democracy with the simultaneous fl ourishing of counter-revolutionary 
groups, which include contemporary right-wing populist groups 
opposing Europeanisation. Radical changes, according to J. Zielonka, 
result from the liberal distortion of freedom, equality, social justice, from 
“betraying” by the “liberal oligarchy” the original ideas at the expense 
of the ideology of power and depriving the electorate of any infl uence 
on politics. Nowadays, an alternative to pro-European groups in the 
European Parliament turned out to be groups using the “policy of fear”, 
38  N. Sienko, Czeska debata wokół kryzysu migracyjnego w przekazie i dyskursie medi-
alnym, „Kultura – historia – globalizacja”, no. 25/2019, p. 163–167. 
39  J. Estevens, op.cit., pp. 8–11.
40  N. Sienko, Czeska debata…, op.cit., pp. 169.
43
N. Sienko, “A Europe of Homelands or Homeland Europe”…
opposing technocracy or weakening the position of nation states, such as 
the Marine Le Pen’s National Front, V. Orban’s Fidesz, and M. Salvini’s 
League.41 
Centrifugal tensions in the EU do not remain visible only within the 
Eurosceptic rhetoric, but concern systemic changes made on January 
31, 2020 by the United Kingdom, deciding to leave the EU structures in 
line with the 2016 referendum. As F. O’Toole admits: “England seems 
to be stumbling towards a national independence it has scarcely even 
discussed, let alone prepared for. It is on the brink of one of history’s 
strangest nationalist revolutions”, and also adds that “the inexorable logic 
of Brexit is the logic of English nationalism: the birth of a new nation 
state bounded by the Channel and the Tweed”.42 The motive for Great 
Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is therefore the pursuit of independence 
in the face of barriers imposed by participation in the EU community. 
The concept of “Global Britain” (building relationships “with old friends 
and new allies”), the need for implementation of which was emphasised 
by T. May, is to be an expression of openness to the world and building 
bold trade ties.43
The wave of comments about the next act of leaving – “Czexit”, 
“Swexit”, “Nexit”, “Italexit” resulted in uncertainty about the future 
of the EU. Therefore, the question arose whether “being” a European 
results only from living in the geographical area of Europe, recognising 
the European identity as a political construct, or does it mean actually 
adopting a certain model of group identifi cation? When in Great Britain 
T. May mentioned that the British were leaving the EU in the national 
interest but would not renounce their European heritage,44 the leader of 
the Swedish Democrats J. Åkesson, calling the EU structures “the main 
force of corruption”, announced the construction of a Swedish national 
space, free from membership. G. Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Party for 
Freedom, also spoke about the EU as an identity-interfering “expansionist 
monster”.45 However, if the further implementation of “separation” 
41  J. Zielonka, op.cit., pp. 15–19.
42  F. O’Toole, Brexit is being driven by English nationalism. And it will end in self-rule, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/england-eu-referendum-
brexit (access 27.02.2021). 
43  Theresa May’s Brexit speech at London’s Lancaster House, 17.01.2017, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0rRnTFJszU (access 27.02.2021). 
44  Ibidem. 
45  Referendum w sprawie członkostwa w UE, https://skandynawiainfo.pl/referen-
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initiatives seems to remain distant, it suggests considerable dissatisfaction 
of the Member States with the results of European integration and the 
particular need to consolidate and protect state security.
Conclusions
It does not seem possible to talk of the near future of  “the state of  Europe”, 
a “homeland Europe” – a federation of EU nation states. Although the 
times of war in Europe are but a memory, the construction of an integral 
political area, apart from structural issues, faces a number of constraints. 
Some limitations include various models of economic and cultural policy, 
separate historical experiences, political divisions and representations, 
indicators of poverty, the level of economic emigration, and problems in 
shaping national awareness into being constructed ideas of the nation. 
Consequently, the conditions under which the European Communities 
were established and the EU evolved depended on the motives of action, 
capabilities, ambitions of the Member States and different perceptions of 
transnational integration.
It is also diffi cult to imagine the situation mentioned by S. Fabbrini, 
who recognises that an EU federation could be established within the 
countries belonging to the euro area, institutionally separating from 
those which strive to maintain unwavering national sovereignty. From 
the beginning of the establishment of the European Communities, this 
form of cooperation has not been used by the Member States. If it were 
so, it is impossible not to agree with J. Zielonka that Germany, France, or 
Belgium would create a small federal state. Thus, the formal promotion 
of the concept of a “two-speed Europe” could be economically and 
politically diversifi ed and, culturally, the EU should strengthen the sense 
of marginalisation and lead to the replacement of the organisation with 
many other initiatives or strengthening of integration within the existing 
ones, such as The Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative, the Central 
European Initiative, the Slavkov Declaration.46
However, it seems that both the concept of “upward” and “downward” 
integration towards disintegration remain unprofi table for the Member 
States. The future of the Union will depend on how far it is possible 
to move “aside” – from the centralisation of the Union’s power to the 
46  S. Fabbrini, Which European Union? Europe after the euro crisis, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. XVII–XVIII; M. Graczyk, Pomysł na Europę pilnie 
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political activity of cities, non-governmental organisations and citizens, 
participating in shaping and developing political, social and economic 
initiatives.47
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